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Abstract
By 2025, U.S. air traffic is predicted to
increase three fold and may strain the current air
traffic management system, which may not be able
to accommodate this growth. In response to this
challenge, a revolutionary new concept has been
proposed for U.S. aviation operations, termed the
Next Generation Air Transportation System or
“NextGen”. Many key capabilities are being
identified to enable NextGen, including the use of
data-link communications. Because NextGen
represents a radically different approach to air
traffic management and requires a dramatic shift in
the tasks, roles, and responsibilities for the flight
deck, there are numerous research issues and
challenges that must be overcome to ensure a safe,
sustainable air transportation system. Flight deck
display and crew-vehicle interaction concepts are
being developed that proactively investigate and
overcome potential technology and safety barriers
that might otherwise constrain the full realization of
NextGen. The paper describes simulation research,
conducted at National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Langley Research Center,
examining data-link communications and traffic
intent data during envisioned four-dimensional
trajectory (413T)-based and equivalent visual (EV)
surface operations. Overall, the results suggest that
controller pilot data-link communications (CPDLC)
with the use of mandatory pilot read-back of all
clearances significantly enhanced situation
awareness for 413T and EV surface operations. The
depiction of graphical traffic state and intent
information on the surface map display further
enhanced off-nominal detection and pilot
qualitative reports of safety and awareness.
Introduction
A key enabler of envisioned operations under
NextGen and its “net-centric” environment is data-
link communications and a voice-by-exception
airspace environment. The research literature
suggests that data-link may improve one source of
miscommunications – the inability to get the
message from one party to the other – but it does
not necessarily address the rest of the
communications process – i.e., whether the message
was understood and whether it accurately conveyed
the speaker’s intent. In a NextGen environment -
with closer spacing and more pilot responsibility for
separation – increased head-down time and
increased workload could significantly reduce
safety margins. Concerns have also been raised in a
net-centric data-link environment on the need or
modality change effects associated with the
presence or absence of “party-line”
communications [1] – [15]. While past work notes
its criticality, these works also show that the “party-
line” information influence is dependent upon crew
resources, communication, and workload. These
influences could possibly be impacted by
generational versions of NextGen – for example,
the potential that A13S-B “in” capability, possibly
augmented with intent data, might provide a
suitable alternative to party-line voice
communications. Because NextGen represents a
radically different approach to air traffic
management, NASA is addressing numerous
research issues and challenges that must be
overcome to ensure a safe, sustainable air
transportation system.
In this study, research specifically addressed:
1) safety concerns regarding changes in
communication modalities and 2) the impact of
emerging NextGen operational concepts and
possible crew-vehicle interface mitigations to
enable operations, such as equivalent visual
operations (EVO), or four-dimensional trajectory
(413T)-based air and surface operations [16]-[17].
Data-Link Communication
The challenge for NextGen is to replicate the
strengths and advantages of the previous
communication method (i.e., voice) while bringing
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to bear the benefits of the new. NASA is
conducting a research portfolio which strives to
meet this goal. Part of this work targets flight crew
assessment of the modality change effects
associated with data-link operations, the impact of
party-line information changes, and potential
mitigating or confounding factors for NextGen
operations. Past research has demonstrated that the
efficacy of party-line information is dependent upon
crew resources, communication, and workload.
These influences are undoubtedly also impacted by
auditory demands and other visual data available to
the flight crew. In particular, what potential exists
in the information available by use of ADS-B “in”
capability, with traffic intent data? Could the visual
display of data-link information and associated
navigation and intent data serve to replace voice
(voice-by-exception) for routine communications
and compensate for the potential impacts of party-
line information loss or inherent latencies in
managing mixed voice and data pilot-Air Traffic
Control (ATC) communications with Controller-
Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC).
To achieve the NextGen vision, research is
necessary to proactively investigate technology
which may overcome potential safety barriers that
would otherwise constrain surface traffic
optimization, maximum runway capacity through
reduced runway occupancy time, simultaneous
single runway operations, and 4DT and equivalent
visual operations, among others [16]-[17]. These
safety objectives were the focus of a research study
conducted at NASA Langley Research Center that
attempted to examine a set of safety issues
associated with data-link communications with
surface operations being envisioned for NextGen.
The data-link communication experiment
evaluated how data-link implementations and
mixed-modality communication (i.e., voice and
data-link) impact crew decision-making, workload,
situation awareness, and crew coordination during
operational situations conducted under envisioned
4DT EVO NextGen operational concepts. This
paper specifically describes the off-nominal
performance aspects of this research and 4DT taxi
performance. Off-nominal scenarios (e.g., incorrect
clearances, pilot blunders/errors, and data-link
transmission errors) were unexpectedly introduced
as critical tests of the robustness and safety of the
operations.
Traffic Intent Display
A second experiment examined various levels
of traffic intent information on a surface map
display. In this experiment, intent is operationally
defined as aircraft state and assigned 4DT route
guidance information. The experiment assessed
whether intent information may aid or be required
in NextGen operations and to what extent or what
instantiations might be required. The paper
describes the off-nominal detection results only.
Off-nominal event testing was included, testing
surface conflicts and taxi blunders, incorrect data-
link clearances, detection of non-participating
objects, and runway incursions.
METHOD
Research Flight Crews
Twenty-four pilots served as participants for
the research, representing twelve flight crews. Each
flight crew flew for a major U.S. air carrier and was
paired by airline to ensure crew coordination and
cohesion with regard to terminal and surface
operational procedures. The flight crews were
provided with a forty-five minute briefing to
explain the display concepts and evaluation tasks.
After the briefing, a 1-hour training session was
conducted to familiarize the flight crews with the
simulator, the simulated airport, published arrivals
and departures, display concepts, and evaluation
tasks. The flight crews were asked to maintain
good crew resource management and comply with
company-specific standard operating procedures.
Simulation Facility
This research was conducted in the Research
Flight Deck (RFD) simulator at NASA Langley
Research Center (Figure 1). The simulated aircraft
dynamics model was a medium- to long-haul
commercial passenger aircraft. The RFD
configuration is a fixed-based, dual-pilot simulator
with a collimated 200o panoramic out-the-window
scene. Operations were conducted at the Chicago
O’Hare airport (KORD). The out-the-window
scene included realistic taxiways and runways with
appropriate markings, airport lighting, and other
aircraft in various simulated weather/lighting
conditions. The visual acuity of the out-the-
window scene was 20/40 (pixels per degree). The
RFD was equipped with a 30 o Horizontal x 24 o
Vertical Head-Up Display (HUD) located on the
left or captain’s side.
As shown in Figure 1, the simulator has four
large main instrument panel displays referred to as:
(left to right) Pilot’s Primary Flight Display (PFD),
Pilot’s Navigation Display (ND), Co-pilot’s ND,
and Co-pilot’s PFD. The four display panels are
17” Liquid Crystal Displays with 13.25” x 10.5”
viewable space at 1280x1024 (SXGA) resolution
and a 5:4 aspect ratio. The RFD includes a Mode
Control Panel (MCP), Flight Management System
(FMS), Control Display Units (CDU), and
hydraulic side-stick control inceptors (Figure 1).
Figure 1 - Research Flight Deck Simulator
Two Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) were
installed, one for each pilot. The EFBs are mounted
above and outboard of the side-stick control
inceptors near the side window sill. The EFBs
utilize a dynamic menu interface using the line
select buttons or touch-screen operation. Custom
software was developed to provide desired
experimental functionality, including CPDLC,
airport maps and charts. The airport map page and
charts pages displayed standard FAA diagrams that
enabled the pilots to zoom and pan utilizing
available buttons on the interface.
Display Formats
Flight deck display concepts were developed
to evaluate how data-link may be implemented for
NextGen and how best to optimally display that
information to the flight-crew. In the following,
candidate flight deck display concepts are shown.
These concepts have been designed, based on
current state-of-the-art flight deck display concepts
(Boeing 787, Airbus A350, & Gulfstream G550)
and modified for the study to support terminal area
and surface operations. These candidate solutions
were evaluated against the envisioned NextGen
issues and instantiations of data-link.
Figure 2 - Primary Flight Display
Primary Flight Display
The PFD, ND, and Engine Indication and
Crew Alerting System display (EICAS) were
modeled after Boeing 787, Gulfstream G550 and
Airbus A350 instrument panels as current state-of-
the-art production aircraft. The PFD display unit
includes an ATC message area (CPDLC message
area; Figure 2) on the outboard third of the display
unit showing incoming and outgoing ATC data-link
communications in alpha-numerical format.
Incoming messages are color-coded green while
outgoing messages are white. All messages are
time-stamped. The captain’s inboard display unit
shows navigation and EICAS displays.
Navigation Display
The first officer’s inboard display is a full-
screen moving map ND with high airport surface
detail. Unlike today’s equipage, surface and
airborne traffic icons were included to simulate an
ADS-B-In (Automatic Dependent Surveillance
Broadcast) environment. This display
automatically transitions to the surface map display
(described below) after landing, when the ground
speed is less than 80 kts (Figure 3).
Figure 3 - Navigation Display
Figure 4 - Electronic Flight Bag
Electronic Flight Bag Display
The EFB, shown in Figure 4, is used as the
flight crew’s interface for ATC data-link
communications, approach chart and airport
diagram chart references. The CPDLC/ATC
functionality was modeled from existing
commercial aircraft vendor interfaces.
Head-Up Display
The HUD surface operations concepts, Figure
5, evolved from Taxiway Navigation and Situation
Awareness (“T-NASA”) research [18] and Runway
Incursion Prevention System research [19]. The
HUD showed current ground speed in digital
format, the current taxiway, next cleared taxiway,
and centerline markers for the cleared route
(CPDLC-assigned route).
Figure 5 - Heads-Up-Display Concept
In addition, the HUD format included
modifications to accommodate emerging NextGen
4DT surface operations. Speed- or time-based taxi
guidance was calculated and explicitly shown on
the HUD. The 4DT speed and time symbology
guided the flight crews throughout the taxi route to
regulate and meet the required precision of 4DT
surface operation.
Surface Map Display
The nominal surface map display, Figure 6, is
an enhanced version of the track-up navigation
display. Own-ship position is indicated by the large
white chevron. The surface map is automatically
displayed on the ND during the landing rollout or it
can also be manually selected at any time.
The surface map display enhancements were
experimentally added as part of the studies. These
enhancements may help to enable 4DT compliance
and situation awareness. The surface map display
designs largely reflect current RTCA SC-183
working group findings in regard to element shape
and color assignments, and is designed for strategic
use for surface operations (to minimize head-down
time). For instance, when surface traffic is included,
medium tan colored chevrons are shown on the
display when on the surface and cyan when
airborne. When the cleared taxi route is graphically
shown, it is drawn in magenta for own-ship.
Figure 6 - Surface Map Display
Additionally, the alphanumerical display of
4DT guidance and traffic status/intent data was
added to aid in 4DT surface operations. For
instance, one enhancement was a list of aircraft
position and associated state data (obtained from a
modeled ADS-B, TIS-B, and CPDLC-all
surveillance source). This traffic list is shown on
the right side of the display, sorted by proximity to
own-ship with the closest traffic listed first. A
cursor control device can be used to select specific
traffic in the list (magenta box indicates selected
traffic) which brings up additional details of the
selected traffic (lower right of Figure 6). Traffic
details included: type, flight ID, speed, heading,
ATC assigned route (intent), and the range / bearing
from own-ship position. Own-ship-assigned taxi
route could be displayed on the lower center of the
display as a text string, and current position along
that route is highlighted in magenta text. Distance
to the next route segment is also displayed nearby
in green text. 4D trajectory guidance information
(textual) could also be displayed textually on the
bottom of the ND: current state information in
white [ground speed, elapsed time, and Estimated
Time-of-Arrival (ETA) UTC]; while guidance
information [Required Time of Arrival (RTA) in
Greenwich Mean time (UTC), Required Time En-
route (RTE) in min:sec] was shown in magenta.
Actual ground speed in white and guidance ground
speed to meet RTAs was displayed textually in
magenta in the upper left hand corner of the ND.
For the advanced traffic intent surface map
display concepts, when selected by the flight crew,
a traffic’s chevron was highlighted with a white
halo and the intended (ATC assigned) route was
graphically depicted on the map in the traffic icon
color (see Figure 7). This graphical routing
information was augmented with a visual depiction
of 4DT guidance. A guidance cue - a magenta dot -
was shown on the commanded route, moving along
the ATC-assigned route approximately 30 seconds
ahead – and an own-ship speed symbol – a white
circle - showing own-ship position estimated in 30
seconds from present speed and acceleration. The
flight-crew’s task was to overlay the 30 second
speed trend symbol (circle) over the 30 sec RTA
prediction symbology (dot). The same indications
of traffic intent were shown for selected traffic.
The symbology is designed such that conflict areas
(such as crossing routes) can be quickly seen and
interpreted at a glance. Further, the 30 second
ahead gives strategic planning information which
could aid in possible traffic conflicts. End-of-route
symbology was also shown using a white and
magenta diamond to indicate relative ETA and
RTA graphically.
Figure 7 - Advanced Surface Map Display
Experiment One Conditions
Experiment One was designed to evaluate how
data-link implementations and mixed-modality
communication (i.e., voice and data-link) impact
crew decision-making, workload, situation
awareness, and crew coordination for possible
NextGen (circa 2008 through 2025) operational
situations. To reflect evolutionary applications of
data-link and CPDLC, the research examined four
communication modes that have been identified to
represent the gamut of potential technological
implementations:
• Data-Link + Voice: The voice + data-link
condition (where data-link is redundant to voice)
required the pilot-not-flying to respond via both
voice and data-link to ATC clearances. All ATC
clearances were provided by both voice and
CPDLC and heard on the VHF (“party-line”)
broadcast. This condition retains the benefits of
voice and adds the capability for retention and
review of the message in the cockpit. However,
this method may significantly increase the workload
of ATC and the flight crew and does not reduce the
VHF bandwidth.
• Data-Link + Read-back Only: The voice +
data-link condition (where data-link is supplemental
to voice) stipulated that pilots provide radio read-
backs on the VHF channel of received data-link
messages. ATC sent all clearances via data-link
messaging and all flight crews were required to
respond by voice (a condition in which CPDLC was
supplemental to voice). This condition reduced the
VHF chatter by 50% (except for ATC non-routine
communications) and retains the retention/review of
the message in the cockpit. This method also
retains the “read-back” as a checking mechanism as
to whether the communication was correctly
received and understood. The advantage of this
method is that the communication frequency is
reduced but possibly not sufficiently, and ATC
must use both voice (listening) and data-link
concurrently.
• Data-Link Only: The “data-link only”
condition (i.e., data-link as replacement for voice or
voice-by-exception) had no ATC clearances or pilot
read-backs over the voice channel and the
participants were required to respond only through
data-link (except for exigent situations or non-
routine communications). This technique provides
the maximum VHF bandwidth reduction and
simplifies the communication to a single modality.
However, this condition also represents the loss of
the auditory communication benefits (party-line,
intonation, stress, etc.)
• Data-Link + Intent: The data-link only +
traffic intent condition was identical to the data-link
only condition (i.e., data-link as replacement for
voice) but presented additional traffic intent
information (e.g., selected traffic route and
destination information). The condition was
introduced to determine whether providing traffic
intent to the flight crew, shown on the surface map
display (see Figure 8), may mitigate safety issues
described by other research studies as a
consequence of reduced voice communications and
loss of party line information.
Experiment Two Conditions
For this experiment, intent is operationally defined
as the information that collectively provides own-
ship and other aircraft state and assigned 4DT route
guidance and prediction (e.g., ADS-B in/out surface
message; CPDLC-all; TIS-B; etc). The objectives
of Experiment Two were to determine what critical
elements are needed to enable EVO and 4DT
surface operations efficiently but above all, safely.
Essentially, the questions being asked are: whether
it is sufficient to just present the traffic intent
information textually (e.g., data-link clearances of
other aircraft); or, 2) is it required to have a
graphical interface of traffic intent display.
Figure 8 – Own-ship Route & Traffic
For this experiment, the display conditions were:
• A baseline NextGen aircraft capability to include
a surface map display with own-ship only and
CPDLC capability with textual traffic state
information (see Figure 6);
• An intermediate NextGen concept to include a
surface map display with traffic and manual query
capability of other aircraft intent and graphical
depiction of own-ship, target aircraft, and 4DT
paths (see Figure 8);
• An advanced NextGen concept that automatically
prioritizes and selects aircraft while depicting
graphical own-ship and traffic 4DT guidance and
conformance (see Figure 7).
Experimental Design
The results presented herein were part of a
larger research study consisting of three
experiments that were conducted over two-days of
testing for each flight crew. The experiments ran
sequentially and the first two experiments are
described here. The experimental design was a
mixed-subjects factorial design. The independent
variables of interest were communication mode
(Experiment One) or surface map display concept
(Experiment Two) for nominal (within-subjects)
and off-nominal trials (between-subjects). All
flight crews experienced each of the four off-
nominal trials but the communication mode (4
levels) or display concept (3 levels) for each trial
was randomly varied across the participants.
Therefore, each flight crew saw all four off-nominal
events but with each of the different communication
modes or display concept such that across all flight
crews there was a balanced presentation of off-
nominal events paired with communication mode or
display concept dependent upon experiment.
All 20 nominal trials were presented in the
same order to the flight crews but was randomly
ordered in which communication mode was paired
with that trial. The nominal trials provided the
flight crews with experience with the various
communication modes and the varying geometries
of terminal maneuvering area procedures available
at KORD. The nominal trials also served to
increase the total number of trials to provide the
necessary experimental matrix to introduce the off-
nominal trials and to best replicate the operational
conditions most likely to produce errors.
The dependent variables included quantitative
and qualitative measures. The quantitative
measures included 4DT adherence and
conformance (e.g., commanded and actual speed
delta), flight technical error (e.g., root-mean-
squared-error of aircraft position from taxi
centerline), pilot control inputs (e.g., toe brake
force, control wheel column and tiller inputs), off-
nominal detection and response, and flight crew
communication acts [21]. The qualitative measures
included Likert-type post-run questionnaires,
Situation Awareness Rating Technique, and NASA
Task Load Index, and post-experiment paired
comparisons for Situation Awareness (SA) –
Subjective Workload Dominance (SWORD).
Rare Event Scenarios
An overview of the off-nominal rare event
scenarios are presented in the following.
Erroneous Data-link Clearance. The first
off-nominal scenario was created by an incorrect
data-linked clearance that produced a route
disconnect. The erroneous data-link inclusion
would result in the aircraft turning back toward the
active runway instead of toward the concourse
creating a potential runway incursion situation.
The data link clearance was in dissociation
with the voice clearance (for those conditions that
had voice) in that the clearance was stated correctly
by the controller over the voice channel. Therefore,
the flight crew could detect the anomaly if they
heard and understood the dissociation between the
voice and data-link clearances or by reviewing the
data-link clearance fully prior to acknowledging
comply with WILCO (or later during taxiing). It
was hypothesized that voice (as redundant to data-
link) would result in greater awareness and
likelihood of detection of the error because the
flight crew would have more opportunities to
realize the error.
Data-Link Clearance Received for Other
Aircraft. The second off-nominal scenario
examined the effect of erroneously receiving a data-
link clearance intended for another aircraft. The
scenario began with an approach to Runway 22R.
The proper data-link clearance was received prior to
the final approach fix containing the correct landing
and taxi routing data. Approximately 0.5 nm from
the runway threshold, the aircraft received a second
landing clearance that was erroneously sent to the
aircraft although it was intended for another aircraft
conducting operations on a proximate runway. The
clearance contained a similar taxi clearance as the
previous CPDLC message but also had errors that
would result in a route dissociation between the
landing runway and the taxi instructions.
The erroneous message was hypothesized to be
generated by a controller error where the message
was sent to and contained a transposed aircraft call
sign (which was similar to the own-ship aircraft).
For those conditions that included voice, the voice
clearance was accurate and correctly stated the
intended aircraft call sign and taxi clearance. The
hypothesis was that, during the high workload
phase of the approach when the incorrect clearance
was received, the flight crew would not be able to
attend to the CPDLC message and would accept the
clearance without review. This contrasts with the
flight crews who also heard the voice clearance,
thus, providing them an additional opportunity to
recognize that the taxi clearance was not congruent
with the landing runway and was not intended for
their aircraft.
Taxiway Conflict. The third off-nominal
scenario evaluated whether the flight crew would be
task-captured by the 4DT task. The scenario began
as a taxi-out task in which the aircraft received push
back and taxi clearance to the departure runway
with RTA instructions. Once the aircraft accepted
the clearance, another aircraft subsequently landed
and turned off with a taxi clearance to Delta. The
conflicting aircraft communicated on tower
frequency, that they were unsure where Taxiway
Delta was. The conflict aircraft mistakenly turned
on the Taxiway Mike instead of the second taxiway
(Delta) resulting in a potential nose-to-nose
situation.
The objective of the scenario was to determine
if any of the experimental conditions would result
in significant head-down time and increased intra-
cockpit communications that may prevent the
timely identification of the other traffic. (The
scenario was not intended to result in a collision but
would have resulted in a nose-to-nose situation
requiring ground vehicles to tow the aircraft if not
detected in an adequate amount of time.) The
hypothesis was that the flight crew that had either
of the voice and data-link conditions would more
easily recognize the potential conflict and would be
proactive in avoiding the situation because of the
reduction in hypothesized intra-cockpit
communication and reduced head-down time. The
flight crews that had only data-link (e.g., data-link
only and data-link + intent) would instead be
reactive in detecting the situation because of
increased communication and head-down time
involved in interacting with the EFB and surface
map displays.
Approach Runway Incursion. The final off-
nominal scenario for Experiment One (data
communication) created a potential runway
incursion in which an aircraft erroneously taxied
onto the runway and held despite it being cleared
for take-off while the subjects were on final
approach to the same runway. The blundering
aircraft had responded to ATC, but did not correctly
acknowledge the clearance, and the controller failed
to recognize the error (expectancy heuristic). The
aircraft consequently remained on the runway,
unaware that they were supposed to depart because
of the aircraft on approach behind them.
It was hypothesized that having party-line
information would cue the flight crew that an
aircraft was holding on the landing runway. Also,
having data-link with traffic intent might also alert
the flight crew to the runway hazard.
ADS-B Surveillance Failure. An off-nominal
scenario for Experiment Two, examining the
display and use of traffic intent data received by
aircraft, evaluated pilot behavioral response to a
surveillance source failure. Own-ship was taxiing
in low-visibility conditions (1200 RVR). However,
traffic was displayed on the surface map (either
textually and/or graphical icons) and in the FLIR on
the HUD. After turn-off from the active runway,
the aircraft taxiing in front of own-ship lost the
capability to broadcast their intent or positional
information. At this time, the aircraft was removed
from the traffic list and, if available, the traffic icon
representing that aircraft disappeared from the
surface map display. The scenario was designed to
test whether the flight-crew would notice the
absence of critical information in the surface map
display.
Taxi Aircraft Blunder. The next off-nominal
scenario for Experiment Two involved a runway
incursion scenario. Another aircraft taxied into
position for an intersection departure when ATC
had already cleared own-ship for departure. This
scenario evaluated if and how the flight crew were
alerted to this unsafe condition, either by: (a) ATC-
pilot voice communication (present in all
Experiment Two scenarios); (b) detecting the
aircraft on the surface map; or (c) seeing the aircraft
in the HUD FLIR during take-off roll.
Non-Participating Vehicle on Surface. A
significant concern for current and future surface
operations is the prevalence of vehicular traffic that
is non-participating in communication, navigation,
or surveillance in the airport movement area. This
scenario was designed to test whether the flight
crews would get complacent and rely on the surface
map display of traffic information and not
adequately scan for other traffic and vehicles. The
flight crews were aware of the presence of
significant vehicle traffic, representing typical
KORD operations, and that these vehicles were not
under positive surveillance by ATC or position
broadcast to own-ship. During this scenario, a fire-
truck was taxing on the ramp area but got lost and
notified ATC that they may be on a taxiway. The
fire truck was in the grass island between two
taxiways; however, the wingspan of the 757 would
clip the top of the fire truck. Because the fire truck
was broadcasting its position, it was not iconically
shown on surface map but was visible with FLIR
and OTW. The scenario was designed to test
whether the HUD near-domain information (e.g.,
symbology) would task capture the pilot taxiing
and/or whether the surface map displays would
induce reductions in OTW scanning.
Controller Mistake Clearing Own-ship
Across Active Runway. The final off-nominal
scenario tested in Experiment Two involved a
similar scenario as the taxi aircraft blunder except
that own-ship was set-up to cause the incursion. In
this scenario, own-ship was cleared to cross the
active runway at which time another aircraft was
cleared into position-and-hold for take-off. As
own-ship was approaching the hold short line, the
tower cleared the other aircraft for take-off. This
scenario evaluated if and how the flight crew were
alerted to this unsafe condition, either by: (a) ATC-
pilot voice communication (present in all
Experiment Two scenarios) or (b) detecting the
aircraft on the surface map.
Experimental Procedure
The flight crews were recruited from a NASA-
established protocol. Each crew was given detailed
pilot briefing materials prior to their arrival. All
flight crews completed an informed consent and
were provided a detailed briefing by the researchers
upon their arrival. Participants were made aware of
the experimental variables under test but were not
cognizant that off-nominal events would be
presented (this was confirmed in post-experimental
debriefings). Three briefings in-total were
presented over the two days of testing with each
briefing focusing on the specific research
objectives. A 90-minute training session was
conducted prior to the start of each experimental
phase, and pilots were trained to an asymptotic or
equivalent level of performance based on researcher
observations and pilot feedback.
Experiment One: Data Communication
After training, twenty-four trials (20 nominal trials
and 4 off-nominal trials) were conducted with the
appropriate breaks included for each day of testing
(i.e., data communication and traffic intent
experiments). Prior to each trial, the pilots were
briefed on the evaluation task (e.g., approach to
Runway 10) and were provided time to configure
the aircraft for the operation (i.e., approach,
departure, or taxi) and brief the procedure. Once
the flight crew indicated they were ready, the trial
began including a data-linked CPDLC message that
was announced with a chime and displayed on the
PFD CPDLC window and the EFB communication
sub-menu. The First Officer (FO) reviewed and
acknowledged the message through the EFB
(through a quick key access on main menu).
Dependent upon the evaluation task, the trials lasted
between 5 and 10 minutes. Pilots were asked to
adhere to the speed and time commanded guidance
to meet the RTA within a defined tolerance (+/- 5
kts and +/-30 sec), but to note any anomalies and to
ensure safety of the aircraft at all times. After the
trial ended, each pilot was asked to fill out several
questionnaires that were administered on selected
runs (12 experimental runs) that represented a
cross-section of the nominal runs or were nominal
analogs of the off-nominal trials.
Experiment Two: Traffic Intent. The
experimental procedures for Experiment Two,
which evaluated various surface map and traffic
intent display concepts, were identical to
Experiment One. The notable exception was the
four different off-nominal events that were inserted
in the experimental matrix. These off-nominal
events were fundamentally different than the off-
nominal events in Experiment One and pilot de-
briefing confirmed that they were undetected. Full
data-link and voice communications (data-link +
voice) were used in the experiment to avoid
confounds and to provide a consistent set of
environmental conditions across flight-crews and
display conditions.
Experiment One Results
The experiment, as a whole, had numerous
objectives. The focus here is on the off-nominal
results and qualitative data that reflect the efficacy
of communications and display conditions to detect
and recognize errors with flight-deck data-link
CPDLC communications and off-nominal event
detection with the various surface map display
concepts. Quantitative data was collected for the
nominal trials and is presented elsewhere [20].
All significant results are presented using an a
priori significance (a) level of 0.05. Analyses of
Variances (ANOVAs) were performed when
appropriate Multivariate Analysis of Variance
(MANOVA) tests were found to be significant. No
significant results were found between Captain and
FO qualitative ratings (p > 0.05) and, therefore, are
grouped for analyses.
4DT Conformance and Taxi Performance
An ANOVA found no significant main effects
across the four communication modes for cross-
track root-mean-squared error, F(3,94) = 0.867;
ground speed deviation from commanded 4DT
ground speed, F (3,94) = 0.748; and time deviation
from RTA for the nominal analog or equivalently
designed trials, F(3,94) = 1.180. Generally, the
flight crews ranged from 16.45 to 27.45 Root Mean
Square (RMS) error and maintained speeds within
1.5 knots of commanded groundspeed allowing the
aircraft to conform to RTA times within 2.5
seconds of assigned RTA. Therefore, these results
demonstrate that flight-crews are able to maintain
ground speed commands and adhere to required-
time-of-arrival clearances.
Situation Awareness
Situation Awareness Rating Technique
(SART). The SART uses the constructs of: 1)
demand on attentional resources; 2) supply of
attentional resources; and, 3) understanding. Mean
values for SART were computed, where the SART
rating is “understanding” reduced by the difference
of “demand” minus “supply” (i.e., SART =
[understanding – (demand – supply)]).
ANOVAs on the mean SART ratings found
significant main effects across the four
communication modes for all four off-nominal
events.
For the “erroneous data-link clearance” event,
there was a significant effect found, F(3,24) =
5.529. A Student-Newman-Keuls (SNK) post-
hoc test showed that pilots rated the data-link +
voice and data-link + read-back conditions to be
significantly higher for situation awareness than
the data-link only and data-link only + intent
conditions.
• The same significant differences in SART ratings
by condition was found for the “approach runway
incursion” event, F(3,24) = 7.682.
• However, SNK post-hoc tests on the significant
main effects for both the “taxiway conflict”
(F(3,24) = 13.496), and “data-link clearance
received for other aircraft” (F(3,24) = 7.362)
events, evinced that the data-link + read-back
condition was rated significantly higher for
situation awareness compared to the other three
experimental conditions.
In comparison, the subjective SA data for the
corresponding nominal trials showed a significant
main effect for SART, F(3,95) = 40.675. A SNK
post-hoc test revealed three subsets: (a) data-link-
only (1.54), (b) data-link + intent (3.46) and data-
link + voice (3.92) and (c) data-link + read-back
(10.25). Therefore, pilots rated the read-back
only condition to be significantly higher for
situation awareness than the three other
conditions and the data-link only to be the worse
concept for situation awareness during the
nominal trials.
Situation Awareness - Workload Dominance
(SA-SWORD) Scale. An ANOVA revealed a
significant main effect for communication mode for
SA-SWORD, F(3, 69) = 40.601. Post-hoc test
showed that pilots rated the data-link + read-back
condition to be significantly higher for situation
awareness than the other three conditions.
Mental Workload
NASA Task-Load-Index (NASA-TLX). The
post-run work was assessed using the NASA TLX
scale, which is comprised of 6 validated sub-scales
that are thought to represent the underlying
construct (rated 0 - 100). An ANOVA found no
significant main effect for NASA-TLX for any of
the four off-nominal trials, p > 0.05. The four
communication modes were found to be equal in
perceived mental workload as rated by the NASA-
TLX scale. However, for the nominal trials, there
was a significant main effect for NASA-TLX,
F(3,95) = 11.719. SNK post-hoc tests revealed
three subsets where the pilots rated the data-link +
read-back condition (23.58) to be significantly
lower for workload than the other three display
conditions. The data-link + intent (35.32) and data-
link + voice (43.31) were both rated significantly
lower than data-link (54.07).
Subjective Workload Dominance
(SWORD) Scale. An ANOVA revealed a
significant main effect for communication mode for
SWORD, F(3,69) = 68.169. Post-hoc comparisons
evinced that pilots rated the data-link + voice (data-
link as redundant to voice) significantly higher in
mental workload on the SWORD post-experiment
paired-comparison scale compared to the other
three conditions which did not differ statistically
from each other (p > 0.05).
Communication Awareness
Questionnaire Responses. Significant main
effects were found for communication mode for
post-run questionnaire item for communication
awareness for the off-nominal events of “taxiway
conflict”, F(3,24) = 7.527, and “approach runway
incursion, F(3,24) = 8.842. SNK post-hoc tests
revealed that the data-link + read-back condition
was rated significantly higher for communication
awareness than the other display conditions which
did not differ for this measure.
Analyses for qualitative reports of
communication awareness taken during the nominal
trials also revealed a significant communication
mode main effect, F(3,95) = 44.49. SNK post-hoc
test showed three subsets: (a) data-link only was
rated lowest for awareness of aircraft clearances
and party-line information, (b) data-link + intent
and data-link + voice was rated higher than data-
link only but poorer for communication awareness
compared to data-link + read-back, and (c) data-link
+ read-back was qualitatively rated the highest for
the construct than the other three communication
modes.
Post-Experimental Paired Comparison. An
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for
communication mode for communication efficacy,
F(3,69) = 29.635. Post-hoc Least Significant
Difference (LSD) comparisons showed that pilots
rated the data-link + voice and data-link only
conditions to be significantly lower for
communication effectiveness than both the data-
link + Intent and data-link + read-back only
conditions. There were no significant differences
between the data-link + Intent and data-link + read-
back only conditions.
Off-Nominal Event Detection
Erroneous Data-link Clearance. There
were 3 off-nominal events per experiment condition
across the 12 flight crews . Ten of the flight crews
correctly recognized the erroneous data-link
clearance (the inclusion of “Mike Four” in the taxi
clearance) and contacted ATC to query the
clearance and/or reject the clearance. The two
instances where the erroneous clearance was not
detected occurred for the data-link only condition.
Data-Link Clearance Received for Other
Aircraft. All the flight crews with either the data-
link only or data-link + intent condition failed to
detect the data-link clearance received intended for
another aircraft and accepted the new clearance
despite being within 1 nm on final. Upon taxi,
these flight crews realized that the taxi instructions
resulted in a route disconnect from the active
runway to the ramp area and contacted ATC to
request new taxi instructions. However, none of the
six flight crews with data-link + voice or data-link +
read-back accepted the data-link clearance and
correctly recognized that the data-link message was
not specific to their aircraft. These flight crews
ignored the CDPLC message and contacted ATC to
query the message after turn-off.
Taxiway Conflict. The data showed that
none of the flight crews – irrespective of the
experimental condition - experienced a taxiway
conflict. Because all the conditions had a HUD
with a forward-looking-infrared (FLIR) enhanced
vision system, the Captain was able to detect the
traffic taxiing toward them on the same taxiway.
The results showed the significant advantage that an
enhanced vision system provides for low-visibility
operations, especially in this scenario.
Approach Runway Incursion. For the data-
link only condition, there was one runway incursion
(33% of the flight crews) that occurred because the
flight crew was entirely unaware that an aircraft
was in position-and-hold awaiting take-off
clearance when the aircraft landed on the active
runway. For the data-link + intent condition, the
flight crews were able to adequately recognize and
avoid the incursion but were slow in identifying the
evolving situation and reported significant
workload in interfacing with the traffic intent data
and determining what the aircraft was intending to
do. In contrast, the flight crews in both the voice
conditions began discussing the aircraft on the
active runway upon hearing the clearance and then
recognizing that the incursion aircraft had not
taken-off and had ample time to discuss options,
initiate a go-around, and contact ATC as to their
situation.
Experiment Two Results
Detailed data analyses for Experiment Two
are still ongoing and are not available in time for
publication herein. The off-nominal event detection
results are discussed in the following.
Off-Nominal Event Detection
ADS-B surveillance failure. There was a
significant difference across the three display
conditions in terms of detection and recognition of
an ADS-B surveillance failure.
All flight crews detected the ADS-B failure in
the own-ship route and surface traffic with intent
display condition. In all cases, the first officer
noticed the absence during selection of aircraft on
the surface map. Pilot de-brief reports suggest that
these pilots were actively using the surface map
display concept because of the presence of valuable
and useful graphical traffic intent information. The
loss of surveillance data in this case was obvious.
One of four flight-crews failed to detect the
missing aircraft, despite the presence of traffic icons
in the own-ship route and surface traffic display.
Often the Captain noticed the aircraft in the HUD
FLIR and would remark on the absence of the
aircraft on the surface map. In one case, neither
pilot noticed the anomaly.
Three of the four flight-crews with the own-
ship only surface map displays did not detect the
ADS-B failure. The reason was due mostly to the
lack of traffic icons on the surface map.
In the later two cases, the use of textual
display of traffic intent data required significant
cognitive overhead to select and interpret
information and required a manual selection process
to get traffic state and intent data. The crews
consequently did not often use this capability to its
fullest extent. This reduces the amount of time
spent evaluating the surface map display and noting
changes and discrepancies in the data presented.
Taxi aircraft blunder. In this off-nominal
scenario involving a runway incursion during own-
ship departure, only one of the twelve flight-crews
failed to notice the blunder. The data suggests that
this is largely owing to the use of the FLIR to detect
the aircraft. The flight-crews reported significant
value from the HUD FLIR in preventing this
conflict and also, the supplemental utility of hearing
voice communications in which they were made
aware that an aircraft was holding short down the
runway. Additionally, the depiction of traffic on
the surface map was observed to significantly
enhance situation awareness although it was
primarily used to confirm the detection of the traffic
in the HUD FLIR.
Non-participating vehicle on surface. This
off-nominal scenario tested whether flight-crews
would fail to notice a vehicle which was not visible
on the surface map. The scenario was made more
challenging because the fire truck had stopped just
beyond a taxiway intersection. The HUD field-of-
view would not provide much detection.
All flight crews were able to detect the fire
truck suggesting that the presence of a surface map
display head-down or the near-domain information
presented on the HUD did not distract the crew
from the task of scanning OTW for obstacles and
traffic. All the flight-crews detected the vehicle
OTW with the exception of two flight-crews who
noticed the fire truck in the HUD FLIR during taxi
out of the ramp area.
Controller mistake clearing own-ship
across active runway. In this scenario, own-ship
was cleared to cross the active runway but, after
several ATC communications, ATC also cleared
another aircraft to take-off. All flight-crews were
able to detect the potential incursion situation and
stop the aircraft.
Two of the four flight-crews, using the own-
ship only display, were not able to stop short of the
hold-line. This is technically a runway incursion.
All flight-crews with the other two display
conditions were able to stop short of the hold-line.
The majority of these flight-crews detected
the potential conflict from the party-line radio
broadcast of the erroneous clearance for the other
aircraft to take-off. They were also able to verify
this situation by evaluating the surface map display
if it included traffic. The lack of surface traffic
reduced the lead-time available to the flight crew to
mitigate the potential runway incursion.
In this scenario, the HUD and its enhanced
vision capability was not useful because the
incursion aircraft was significantly outside the field-
of-view of the HUD.
Conclusions
The research objective was to evaluate the
flight deck impacts of different data-link
implementations that may be considered as options
for ATC-pilot communications for NextGen.
Across all off-nominal conditions, the results
demonstrated that data-link only is not an optimal
solution for these operations and corroborates
previous research which advises caution for a
voice-by-exception system because of the
significant concerns for reduction of party-line and
situation awareness on the part of the flight crew.
The voice-by-exception experimental condition was
almost universally the highest workload and lowest
situation awareness condition. The off-nominal
results confirmed the finding that voice for routine
communications significantly enhances situation
awareness for terminal maneuvering area operations
The subjective and off-nominal data showed
that the data-link + read-back condition was clearly
the best option across almost all the dependent
variables tested. By requiring pilot read-back of
CPDLC, flight crews responded that they were able
to retain the party-line broadcast awareness because
they knew what the other traffic was “intending” to
do while at the same time reducing the voice
congestion based on the specified traffic density
and scripted clearances and pilot responses used in
present study. This also significantly freed up the
frequency to allow the flight crews to more easily
contact the controller if necessary (e.g., non-routine
communications).
The off-nominal detection results from
Experiment Two further supplements the finding of
Experiment One. The results posit that a surface
map display with traffic significantly enhances
situation awareness and would be a significant
complement to a data-link + read-back only
approach to data communication and CPDLC. For
4DT operations, the use of graphical depictions of
4DT RTA guidance and conformance compliance
seems to further enhance flight-crew capability
although data analyses to date make any
conclusions premature.
Overall, the results demonstrate the
substantial importance of providing some party-line
capability for any new ATC-pilot data
communication system. The conclusion drawn here
is that a promising solution may be the use of
mandatory pilot read-back of CPDLC data-link
routine clearances in the terminal maneuvering
area, particularly with a surface map with traffic
display, and the use of voice communication for all
non-routine and exigent communications; however,
the effect of such an approach on the controller has
yet to be evaluated and the experiment did not
specifically evaluate controller-pilot interactions.
The conclusion matches that observed during the
CASCADE D-Taxi trials at Brussels [22] which
recommended the use of mandatory pilot read-back
as, “...effective mitigation means against erroneous
or non-intended clearance details in the sent
message” (p. 83) and that a flight-deck display of
ground traffic would significantly enhance situation
awareness for data communications in the airport
movement area.
Future Directions
Although the issues of “data-link only”
have been well-documented in the literature for
aircraft operations typical of today’s system, this
“voice-by-exception” data-link protocol continues
to remain the primary communications end-state.
The conclusions drawn from the results presented
herein mirror other research and share the concerns
for implementation of a safe and effective “data-
link only” system for the terminal maneuvering
area. Although voice-by-exception permits voice
communication - and requires voice for non-routine
communications - research suggests that there are
ample situations and opportunities in which a data-
link only approach may reduce safety margins. The
use of mandatory pilot read-back of CPDLC data-
link routine clearances in the terminal maneuvering
area appears promising and will be explored further.
This research has also demonstrated the
utility of flight-deck displays of traffic information
for surface operations for enhancing situation
awareness and safety and mitigation of human
error. This work will continue to evaluate
methodologies and define whether the visual
possibly provide mitigation for the safety concerns
within a voice-by-exception environment.
Figure 9 - Runway Incursion Alerting During
Approach
Finally, the present results demonstrate that
flight crews were able to adhere to required-time-
of-arrival clearances without significant effort even
under reduced visibility conditions and NextGen-
like traffic densities. Results from the traffic intent
research showed that graphical presentation of own-
ship and other traffic intent significantly enhanced
situation awareness and conflict detection; however,
full data analyses are not completed at time of
publication. Future research will focus on
optimization of 4DT algorithms, advanced display
technologies, and conflict detection and alerting
(Figures 9-10) to meet these and other challenges to
NextGen operations.
Figure 10 – Taxi Conflict Alerting
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